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Abstract
As the world is becoming more technological, using electronic voting could be
very beneficial in elections rather using traditional paper-based election schemes.
However, there are many security related issues that can cause significant problems
in electronic voting (e-voting). Violating voters’ privacy or integrity of ballots would
definitely cause serious problems with the entire election process. People may refuse
to accept the electronic form of elections. Existing e-voting systems use sophisticated
but inefficient, and expensive techniques to satisfy the security requirements of evoting. Therefore, most of small and mid-size electoral populations cannot employ evoting systems in their elections and experience remarkable benefits of e-voting. In
this thesis, a new electronic voting approach is proposed using extensible markup
language (XML) to verify and secure the integrity as well as to preserve the privacy of
the voters. The evaluation results of this thesis show that the new approach is an
implementation friendly, efficient, and also cost-effective approach to safeguard
integrity and privacy related security requirements of e-voting systems for small and
mid-size electoral populations.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
As computer and Internet technologies emerged most traditional paper-based
procedures, activities, and systems were replaced by electronic systems. As a result,
most of the important systems like banking systems, hospital systems, and airline
systems started to go online, and providing services to their customers that were
efficient and accurate. Therefore, it is not a surprise that people thought about
introducing the same convenient facilities to their traditional voting systems.
As a result, people started inventing electronic voting systems (EVS) in
different ways (Farivar, 2012). When using EVS, there are not only important
advantages but also many security related issues found in such systems.
Confidentiality, integrity, privacy, and availability are some of the major aspects
needed to be assured when using EVS (Ibrahim, Kamat, Salleh, & Aziz, 2003). It is
very difficult to guarantee these properties in e-voting system, since these types of
systems are very much prone to cyber-attacks, such as denial-of-service attacks.
Cyber attackers or any other hacker may try to diminish the security of EVS to obtain
sensitive ballot data for many reasons, such as financial benefits.
Introducing new safety procedure and approaches to e-voting are therefore
important. Those new approaches will help improve not only the security of the
system but also the quality of the EVS. From years of use and experience with the
traditional paper ballot approach, we already know that it is a safe and secure system
to a great extent. Therefore, the electronic form of voting must guarantee that it is at
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least as safe as current traditional system. In this thesis, combination of
cryptographic and XML technologies were introduced to EVS in order to secure
integrity and privacy properties of EVS in an affordable and efficient manner.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the related
work. Chapter III describes the design of this thesis in detail. Chapter IV describes
the implementation of the prototype system. Chapter V presents the results and
evaluation. Finally, Chapter VI presents conclusions and discusses possible future
work.
Problem Statement
Existing e-voting systems use complex and expensive approaches to maintain
the security attributes such as integrity and privacy. Therefore, it is not affordable to
use electronic voting in small and mid-size electoral populations. Moreover, those
expensive systems can only be implemented on specific platforms and may not
efficiently process electronic ballots.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Electronic voting has substantial advantages over traditional paper-based
voting, such as increase in voter turnout, fast, convenience, and accelerate the
decision making process. However, because of the complex methods involved and
the requirement of expensive infrastructure to secure the EVS, most small and midsize electoral populations cannot use electronic voting systems and miss the
opportunity to obtain the aforementioned significant advantages. This thesis study
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was useful in finding new approaches to minimize the abovementioned barriers when
using electronic voting in Small and mid-size electoral populations.
Objective of the Study
The objective of this thesis is to introduce a new approach to secure the
integrity and privacy of electronic voting systems by using a cost-effective and
efficient approach which can be implemented on any platform.
Limitations of the Study
The proposed new approach of this thesis focused only on two security
attributes of electronic voting systems, namely, integrity and privacy. In addition, the
implementation of the proposed approach highly focused on small and mid-size
electoral populations rather large scale elections.
Summary
This chapter discussed the importance of electronic voting and current security
related issues of EVS. Moreover, this chapter briefly discussed the significance of the
proposed new approach and its limitations. The next chapter discusses in detail the
literature related to the security issues of EVS, critical security attributes, and
software security technologies.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
In this chapter, the background of e-voting systems, their security related
issues, current technologies that support the safeguarding and maintenance of the
security of software systems are discussed. Furthermore, the chapter discusses in
detail the cutting-edge technologies used in the proposed new approach in order to
protect the security of EVS.
Background Related to the Problem
Most of countries continue research on advance e-voting systems because it
offers an extraordinary set of advantages that cannot simply be ignored. Countries
like, Australia and Canada have already used e-voting in some parts of their
countries while Estonia has used it nationwide. Figure 1 shows how Internet Voting
was used around the world by 2012 (Esteve, Goldsmith, & Turner, 2012). Figure 2
visualizes how the countries around the world either extended or discontinued the
implementation of electronic voting by 2015 (Krimmer, 2015). According to the
Figure 2, most countries have significantly expanded the use of electronic voting
while a few countries discontinued electronic voting, primarily due to software
security concerns.

14

Figure 1. Internet voting around the world by 2012 (Esteve et al., 2012, p. 14).

15

Grey: no e-voting
Yellow: discussion and/or voting technology pilots
Orange: Discussion, concrete plans for Internet voting
Dark green: Ballot scanners and/or Electronic Voting Machines (legally binding)
Green: Internet voting (legally binding) (also used with other voting technologies)
Red: Stopped use of voting technologies

Figure 2. Electronic voting around the world by 2015 (Krimmer, 2015).
Types of E-Voting Systems
Basically voting systems are divided into two broad categories, namely paper
ballot and e-voting. Electronic voting systems are further divided into several other
types as follows.
Telephone voting. Telephone voting systems allow people to cast their vote
through a telephone connection. Voters can select option according to the instruction
they hear and even use the key pad to make selections. Some systems are capable
of recognizing voice as well. Voter verification is very difficult with telephone voting
systems (Technology and the Voting Process, 2014).
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Optical scanner. With this system, paper ballots are read by means of an
optical scanner. Candidate options are indicated with numbered circles and a voter is
supposed to fill the circle according to their choice. Then the paper ballots are fed
into a ballot box (Electronic Voting Systems, 2014).
Internet voting. With the advance of the Internet, voting through the Internet
has become very popular. Nowadays, most organizational small to midlevel polls are
conducted through the Internet. For instance, universities are using Internet Voting
for their student body elections because it provides greater flexibility to cast their vote
while they stick to their tight schedules. Most of the issues with other voting systems
can be avoided with Internet voting, such as voter verification difficulties, privacy and
integrity related issues (Electronic Voting Systems, 2014).
Direct recording electronic voting systems (DRE). This is another popular
way of voting by means of computers. Most often interfaces of these machines are
equipped with buttons or a touch screen. DREs are capable of issuing results quickly.
There is a low risk of machine failures. With DREs, e-voting systems developers can
provide facilities to voters to customize the interfaces for their convenience. When the
ballots (vote data) are transmitted from a polling booth to another location through
public network, then it is called “Public network DRE voting system” (Wolf,
Nackerdien, & Tuccinardi, 2011).
Advantages of E-Voting Systems
Electronic voting systems can simply be altered to be used with different type
of elections, with minimal modification cost. For example, if a university builds an
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e-voting system for its student body general election, the same system can be
modified to be used in a university presidential election. Moreover, e-voting systems
support the election process to maintain the integrity of ballots by imposing rules and
restricting invalid entries to the system through the electronic ballot. For instance, if
the election expects the voters to type only three candidates’ names, system can
restrict it to definitely three candidates’ names. Though voters may accidentally want
to put additional names, they won’t be able to do so.
With e-voting, it will be much easier to access the voting system. The disabled
or handicapped person can be able to vote even without leaving their home. When
voting is as easy and as accessible as this, participation rates would increase much
more (Gerlach & Gasser, 2009). In addition, e-voting systems can be designed in a
way that is very user friendly and very informative to its users (i.e., election
administrators, voters, etc.). For instance, if a particular entry is confusing, the
system can display “More Information” icons or even pop up messages that can
guide its users to eliminate any mistakes. These pop up error messages typically
convey what exactly went wrong and may suggest how to avoid potential problems.
Depend on the conflicts situations, it can show customized messages which is not
possible with a paper format ballot. It would vastly reduce the amount of paper being
used, compared to using the traditional paper ballot.
Live validation is another great benefit comes with e-voting system. The
system is capable of validating user input as the user progresses through the system.
During the user casting his/her vote, the system can validate its input behind the
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screen and let the user know about any invalid inputs and make corrections before
the voter casts the vote and leaves the polling booth. In this way the user has an
opportunity to assure his/her vote’s validity and acceptance for the current election
before even he or she logs out of the system (Voter Validation Process FAQs, 2017).
Disadvantages of E-Voting Systems
Cost of the system. The election authority may have to spend millions of
dollars to introduce new e-voting systems. Some countries might need a certification
from higher authority to use this kind of systems in public elections. If that happens
rigorous amount of testing is required to get the certification and it also may
significantly increase the expenses (Wolf et al., 2011).
Security threats. Electronic voting systems are vulnerable to several different
types of attacks. A minor security hole would be enough to compromise the whole
system and deliberately change casted votes or even delete all voting data. Denialof-services attacks can be launched to disrupt the availability of the system while
Trojan applications can be used to breach confidentiality of ballot data and the
privacy of voters. Even operating systems or e-voting system developers themselves
can place malicious applications and deliver the product (i.e., new or modified evoting systems) to election authorities (Wolf et al., 2011).
Lack of public confidence. Some people do not trust e-voting systems due
to several reasons. They believe authorized election personnel or hackers can alter
their ballots easily. Due to the lack of public confidence, some countries like the UK
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and the Netherland have already moved away from using e-voting systems in their
local and national elections (Esteve et al., 2012).
Main Security Areas of E-Voting
As critical software systems, electronic voting systems must satisfy several
important security requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
privacy.
Confidentiality. Confidentially refers to safeguarding a voter’s sensitive
information (i.e., ballot data, voters’ information, etc.) and other data related to the
system from being disclosed to unauthorized persons or parties. In other words, it
must properly protects the secrecy of the ballots (Chia, 2012).
Integrity. Integrity means safeguarding the accuracy of ballot data and
software integrity of the system. All these sensitive data must be protected from
unauthorized modifications. The trustworthiness of both the data and the system
functionalities plays a very important role in e-voting systems (Chia, 2012).
Availability. Availability refers to the amount of time that the system is
accessible to the users (voters and all other election authorized personnel and
systems). The system may still be available even under reduced speed. However,
due to some external interference, such as malicious attacks or any other system
malfunction, it could become unavailable (Chia, 2012).
Privacy. Privacy in e-voting means, anyone should not be able to associate a
ballot with the voter who casted it. A voter should not be able to prove how he/she
cased his/her vote to an external party, so that vote buying and extortion can be
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prevented. When using e-voting systems, some voters may face difficulties and may
need assistant from another person due to some disabilities, such as partial
blindness. If that occurs, privacy of those voters might be violated when a second
person interferes. In e-voting, election administrators or other authorized personnel
may not need privacy protection as do the voters in an election (Cranor & Cytron,
1996).
Other Properties of E-Voting
Receipt freeness. This property helps to prevent a voter to prove to another
person or any other party, how he or she casted his or her vote (Delaune, Kremer, &
Ryan, 2006).
Non-repudiation. This property prevents the actual sender of data (e-ballot
etc.) from denying they are the actual sender (Rusinek & Ksiezopolski, 2009).
Literature Related to the Problem
Santin, Costa, and Maziero (2008) presented a three-ballot-based secure
electronic voting system which is integrated into a single architecture. The system
considered securing voter privacy, anonymity, and vote receipts, etc. The proposed
system aims to satisfy security requirements of e-voting systems by reducing the
complexity by using classic cryptography techniques such as standard public key
cryptosystem rather using visual cryptography. This practical approach was
implemented as a prototype by mean of election markup language (EML) and other
web services. The proposed approach could be applied in an election which covers a
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large geographical area, as well as in several other elections such as corporate and
academic elections while reducing the cost of deployment.
Ansari et al. (2008) stated that government agencies have been replacing
traditional paper-based voting systems with electronic voting systems. Although the
electronic voting system are certified by federal and state government agencies,
many people question their privacy, security, and performance. This paper presented
the findings of a project that revealed several threats against the security
requirements of electronic voting systems such as violation of voters’ privacy.
Moreover, the authors of this paper suggested several solutions for the development
of electronic voting systems to minimize the threats against security requirements,
such as developing direct record election (DRE) systems, in a way where these
systems can hide the voter selection screen from election officials when the voters
seek assistance during the election process.
Sebe, Miret, Pujolis, and Puiggali (2010) discussed the importance and current
challenges of electronic voting such as ensuring security requirements of remote evoting systems. This study mainly discussed the problems of using complex and
costly approaches in verifying the correctness of voting process, particularly in
current vote mixing verification processes of remote e-voting systems. The authors of
this paper proposed a new remote voting scheme which made the voting process
more efficient, less complicated, and cost-effective while satisfying the security
requirements of electronic voting such as integrity, confidentiality, and privacy.
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Olaniyi, Arulogun, Omidiora, and Oludotun (2013) designed a secure voting
system primarily focused on improving the security requirements for authentication
and integrity of e-voting systems in an efficient and reliable way. The authors of this
paper highlighted the important characteristics of ballots in a democratic election
such as anonymity and tamper resistance of ballots. The proposed design of the
secure voting system used cryptographic hash functions to assure the integrity and
one time short message service (OTSMS) plus grid card multifactor authentication to
minimize possible errors that may take place during voter authentication.
Kumar and Srinivasan (2013) proposed a practical approached to preserve
privacy of electronic voting. The authors discussed three types of internet voting
systems, namely poll site, kiosk, and remote and also explained the advantages and
the problems of those e-voting systems. The proposed new scheme used smart card
techniques which employed blind signature. The design of the new system focused
on key functions of the new generation smart card technologies that aided to secure
the operations of internet voting systems and the privacy of the voters.
Literature Related to the Methodology
In XML, there are three types of digital signatures as follows (Bartel, Boyer,
Fox, LaMacchia, and Simon, 2013; XML digital signature [APA], n.d.).
Enveloped. The signature element is placed in the XML document as a child
element of the root element of the XML document.
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<election>
<vote>
<chairperson> candidate1 </chairperson>
<secretary> candidate2 </secretary>
</vote>
<signature>
.....
</signature>
</election>
Enveloping. Here the signature element is the root element of the XML
document and the main document elements become the child elements of the
signature element. The actual data elements are embedded in an auxiliary tag such
as object tag.
<signature>
:
<object Id = “something”>
<election>
<vote>
<chairperson> candidate1 </chairperson>
<secretary> candidate2 </secretary>
</vote>
</election>
</object >
</signature>
Detached. In here, neither enveloped nor enveloping is used. The signature
elements and data can be in the same XML document or in a separate file. When
these two in the same document, signature and data become siblings.

24
<rootelemet>
<election>
<vote>
<chairperson> candidate1 </chairperson>
<secretary> candidate2 </secretary>
</vote>
</election>
<signature>
:
</signature>
</rootelemet>
The signing process consists of three steps.
i.

The signed electronic document is canonicalized by using C14N
algorithm. By doing this, impact on the signature from different
formatting can be avoided

ii.

Document hash value or digest is computed using hash algorithm such
as SHA1, SHA256 or MD5

iii.

The signature is encrypted using the private key of the sender. Public
key algorithm such as RSA DSA is used for this purpose.

During the validation receiver perform the following steps.
i.

The XML document is canonicalized

ii.

The signature is decrypted using sender’s public key and then
recomputed the hash value

iii.

If the comparison of recomputed hash and the declared hash value
pass, then the validation passes.
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Figure 3 depicts how an electronic document is digitally signed and Figure 4 depicts
how to verify the integrity of the document.

Figure 3. Digital signature signing.

Figure 4. Digital signature verification.
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The signature element. The following structure shows the simplest form of
XMLDSIG element which is a key element of the proposed system. <SignedInfo>
element contains information regarding the signature.
<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
(Canonicalization Method)
(Signature Method)
<Reference>
(Digest Method)
(Digest Value)
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
(Signature Value)
</Signature>
Symmetric key cryptography. This is also called secret key algorithm. For
both encryption and decryption, same key is used. Therefore, the key has to be
delivered securely to the other party. Compared to asymmetric cryptography,
symmetric cryptography is comparatively fast. Advanced encryption standard (AES)
is one of popular symmetric key algorithm (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007).
Asymmetric key cryptography. This is also known as “Public key
cryptography”. A pair of independent keys is (Private/Public) used to encrypt and
decrypt data. Although the public key is publicly known, determining corresponding
private key is almost impossible. With Public key cryptography, no need to worry
about secure exchange of keys among all involved parties. However, this method is
slower than Symmetric key cryptography and also requires more computer
processing power for both encryption and decryption. The RSA algorithm is an

27
example for public key cryptography algorithms (Konheim, 2007; Whitman & Mattord,
2009).
Hashing algorithms. Hash algorithms are used to generate a value (this
value is also known as a digest) according to its input data, such as a message or a
document. When data are sent over unsecured channels, hash values are used to
verify the integrity of data (Ciampa, 2009). These algorithms can be easily used to
defeat Man-in-the-middle attacks. SHA-1 is a popular hash algorithm.
Summary
In this chapter, background and literature related to the problem as well as
literature related to the methodology were discussed. The next chapter explains in
detail the methodology that was followed in this thesis.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
In this chapter, the design of the proposed e-voting system is explained in
detail. The steps of the new system’s design structure, the use of cryptographic
techniques in the system design, and the use of XML-based technologies in the
electronic voting processes, are covered in detail in this chapter.
Survey of E-Voting Systems
In this thesis, before developing the proposed new e-voting system, a survey
was conducted regarding the security requirements of e-voting systems. The survey
results were helpful to identify the most important security attributes and major
security concerns of current e-voting systems. When replacing traditional voting
procedures with e-voting, people will expect the same properties as with a paper
ballot system. Voters’ point of view, lack of security on integrity and privacy can
mainly contribute to deprivation of voter’s rights. Even software bugs are a threat to
software integrity while data integrity can be compromised through unauthorized
modifications. However, this thesis only concerns issues related to the data integrity
rather than software integrity of the e-voting system.
Every e-voting system must take strong steps to avoid compromising voters’
privacy. Otherwise, they will have to face serious political, social, legal, and ethical
problems. These negative outcomes may include even financial losses or damaged
reputation. The following survey results show that most of voters are highly
concerned about the integrity and the privacy of their votes. In addition, the survey
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shows that the potential threats for e-voting systems in terms of integrity and
privacy are also high. Complete survey questions and their answers are shown in
Appendix A.
Q4: How do you rank the following e-voting attributes according to potential
threat level (Give one to highest)?
Figure 5 visualizes the results of the survey for this question.

Figure 5. Survey question 4.
Q5: How do you rank the following e-voting attributes according to the level of
harmfulness on voters if a malfunction take place in voting process (Give “one” to the
most harmful attribute)?
Figure 6 visualizes the results of the survey for this question.
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Figure 6. Survey question 5.
Q6: Select your top 3 e-voting attributes that you expect from an e-voting
system as a voter.
Figure 7 visualizes the results of the survey for this question.
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Figure 7. Survey question 6.
Q8: In your opinion what is the e-voting attribute which has more social and/or
ethical issues?
Figure 8 visualizes the results of the survey for this question.
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Figure 8. Survey question 8.
Design of the Study
The design of the new prototype e-voting system accomplishes the following
tasks.
i.

Creates separate electronic ballot (e-ballot) for each voter very efficiently

ii.

Assures the integrity of each ballot by means of XML Digital Signature

iii.

Assures the privacy of the voter by means of XML Encryption
Technologies and new design architecture.
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Because the major goal of this thesis is to assure the integrity and the privacy
of EVS used in small and mid-size electoral populations in an efficient and costeffective way, the major processes, such as encryption mechanism and ballot singing
process should be completed very quickly and in a less expensive manner, so that
nobody or any malicious applications such as Trojans or other virus applications have
sufficient time to perform their malicious activates. In computer-based systems, minor
process delays may create unprotected and unintentional entry points to breach the
security of the system. Therefore, introducing lightning fast data processing is very
important aspect of security of critical systems such as EVS.
Therefore, creating a separate ballot for each voter would be an ideal solution
to make the whole process efficient by reducing the amount of data to be processed
during the election phase. Apart from that, individual ballot approach helps to secure
voter’s privacy better than storing all voters’ ballot data in a single file, in case the
system’s security is breached. The single file method may make all data vulnerable to
malicious activities and might not give sufficient time to isolate unaffected data from
infected data, after detecting any ongoing unauthorized activities. Thus, individual
ballot method can be used to isolate tampered ballots easily.
In order to assure the integrity, ballot data need to be secured throughout the
election process. The robust XML Encryption technologies (Imamura et al., 2013)
come in handy to achieve this goal when XML data represent the ballot data (AlHamdani, 2010; Imamura, Clark, & Maruyama, 2002). However, as the second step
of integrity assurance procedure, tampering of data by any means need to be
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detected. At this point XML Digital signature plays an important role in detecting any
data modifications after the election process (The admin process signs each ballot
immediately after voter cast his/her vote) (Dournaee, 2002; Eastlake & Niles, 2002).
The steps of the proposed e-voting system’s processes are as follows.
i.

Voter cast his/her vote using a DRE kiosk or through a web interface

ii.

An electronic ballot (e-ballot) is created for each voter separately and all
required ballot data are stored in the e-ballot, which is in XML format.
The data is stored in XML elements in a way it supports to secure the
privacy of voters

iii.

Each ballot is directed to the election administration process. The
administration process creates copies of the e-ballot for each process
of the electronic voting system

iv.

Digest is generated for each process. Thereafter, separate digital
signatures for each process are embedded into the e-ballots

v.

Data belonging to each election process is encrypted through XML
encryption to safeguard integrity

vi.

Upon receiving e-ballots, each process decrypts the data belonging to
them. The digital signature for the process is now accessible

vii.

Each process verifies the integrity of e-ballots by means of a separate
public key given by the administration process to each election process
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viii.

Tally process can verify voters’ identification (ID) by sending encrypted
IDs to the administration process without exposing sensitive
information

ix.

Tally process starts counting votes in the system.

The following paragraphs explain in detail the whole process of the proposed
e-voting system. Figure 9 shows the overview of the proposed system.
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Figure 9. Overview of the proposed e-voting system design.
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As the starting point when the user logs on to the proposed e-voting system,
the voter can make his/her choices and cast the vote. The moment he/she presses
the “Press Here to Vote” button, an e-ballot is created in XML data format and
stores all required data in pre-defined elements in the XML document as shown in
Figure 10. Each e-ballot represents the vote of only one voter.

Figure 10. Voter cast ballot.
The data processing starts at the administration process that generates
digests from the data in the e-ballots. Once it finish generating the digests using
SHA-1 hash function, digital signatures for each process are generated with the
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private key of the administration process as shown in Figure 11. For instance, if the
e-voting system has three other processes in addition to administration process, the
administration process generates three different digital signatures for each process
and embeds those digital signatures in the e-ballot. The other three processes will
have the relevant public key for the decryption process.
Even though it is almost impossible to determine the private key from the
public key, in this proposed system, three different private/public key pairs are
created for the digital signature processes of the three processes in order to further
increase the security of the system. However, because only the digests are signed
instead of the entire document data, computer processing will be significantly
reduced and signing process will be performed promptly (Digital Signatures [APA],
n.d.).
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Figure 11. E-ballot signing process.
Here, RSA algorithm is employed as the asymmetric key algorithm. In order to
secure the integrity of data, administration process encrypts the relevant data of each
process with the public key of appropriate process. For instance, data belong to tally
process is encrypted by the public key of the tally process as shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. E-ballot encryption.
Once the election phase is over, all ballots (i.e., encrypted and digitally
signed ballots) are sent to each process by the administration process as shown in
Figure 13. Upon receiving ballots, each process decrypts the ballot data by means of
their private keys and prepares ballots for the validation.
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Figure 13. E-ballot decryption.
Signature is obtained by using admin’s public key that generated only for the
tally process and the digest is regenerated using the same algorithm which used at
the second step. If the previous digest and the regenerated digest are not the same,
it implies that unauthorized person or system tampered with the data. Figure 14
depicts this signature verification process.
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Figure 14. Signature verification.
A person (i.e., authorized personnel in the election process or any other
outside person) or an unauthorized process or a third party malicious application
must not be able to map voters to their ballots. The structure of the elements in the
e-ballot is defined to ensure the privacy of voters. Some processes might need to
have voter’s ID within their authorized domain for an activity like “Voter Verification”.
At this point, administration process encrypts the ID with the administrator’s
symmetric key and places the encrypted voter’s ID within the area belonging to the
specific process as shown in Figure 15. For this purpose the advanced encryption
standard (AES) algorithm will be used by the administrator.
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Figure 15. Privacy protection.
One can imagine the following scenario to get an idea about how to protect
the privacy of the voter from being breached. Assume that the tally process needs
to verify the voter’s ID before starting the counting sub-process. The voters’ ID in the
e-ballots are encrypted and the tally process cannot decrypt and see the voters’ Ids
in plain text. At this time, the tally process can only request the administration
process to validate voter’s IDs available within its domain. Then, the administration
process validates each ID and issues the status of the ID to the tally process. The
tally process can then tabulate their data as shown in the following table.
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Table 1
Tally Process Data
Vote

Voter’s ID
(Scrambled
data)

ID
Status

wetegertgerttqw

Valid

tettegfhtyjkuywe

Valid

Ytiutyityitiiu56trt

Invalid

teryrhbnfkujywe

Valid

Chair Person
Candidate1

Candidate2

Secretary
Candidate3

X

Candidate1

Candidate2

Candidate3

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

The tally process or admin process will never see a voter’s ID and candidate
selections of the voter together to breach privacy. Figure 16 depicts how this step is
performed by the system. After successfully performing all tasks including
functionalities related to integrity and privacy, ballots are stored in the secure
database.

Figure 16. Voter verification.
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Because the administration process generate separate digital signatures for
each process, each process can behave independently and verify the integrity of the
receiving ballots by their own. Otherwise, one process needs to depend on another
process to obtain the status of the integrity of the e-ballots. That kind of dependent
approach may introduce some security flaws during the election operation time.
For instance, if the validation process is responsible for validating the digital
signature and the validation process is compromised by an unauthorized party, then
the unauthorized party can issue a false status of integrity to the other dependent
processes. Even in a situation where the validation process is not compromised, a
malicious program would be is capable of executing its malicious operations in
between two processes, alter the status of the integrity, and make the other process
believes that the e-ballots have not been tampered with. In e-voting systems, many
malicious attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks which are launched by hackers,
can be avoided successfully by means of XML digital signature technologies
(Ciampa, 2009). However, for various other purposes each process needs to
collaborate with other process. The above mentioned independency is important,
because the integrity of the ballots is very crucial in terms of the validity of the whole
election.
Summary
This chapter explained how the new proposed e-voting system was designed
in order to secure its integrity and privacy by using cryptographic and XML based
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technologies. The next chapter explains in detail how the proposed approach is
implemented on a Windows platform as a prototype application.
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Chapter IV: Implementation
Introduction
In this chapter, the implementation of the proposed EVS is explained. The new
EVS was named as X-Ballot and it followed the methodology explained in Chapter III.
This chapter explains in detail the technologies, techniques, and software tools used
to implement the X-Ballot system. Figures of both system user interfaces and system
generated files were used to illustrate how the proposed new X-Ballot system works.
System Implementation
The basic architecture of the X-Ballot system is based on the direct recording
electronic (DRE) voting system and the X-Ballot employees Microsoft Windows
based XML encryption and digital signature technologies for the implementation.
The X-Ballot was implemented with Microsoft Visual Studio.Net 2013
framework (How to: Sign XML Documents with Digital Signatures [APA], n.d.; How to:
Verify the digital signatures of XML documents [APA], n.d.) using C# programming
language. The Visual Studio framework supports XML security standards used in the
proposed approach and the .Net framework produced the required infrastructures
such as library classes for encryption/decryption of XML documents and other
essential classes for digital signature process. Furthermore, graphical user interfaces
(GUI) of the X-Ballot were also created using Visual Studio.Net 2013.
In order to begin the voting process, authorized users (voters) can log into the
system using valid user credentials that are provided by the administration of the
election during the voter registration process. Voters can use the vote form shown in
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Figure 17 to cast the electronic votes. Voter’s ID information is displayed at the top of
the form (i.e., voter IDs’ for general registration process and voter’s ID only for the
tally process). Using this vote form, voters are able to select one candidate for each
job post (i.e., President, Secretory, and Treasurer) shown in the form. The voter’s
selections are displayed at the bottom of the form so that the voter can make sure as
to whom they are going to vote for. After the confirmation, the voter can press the
“Press Here to Vote” button at the bottom of the vote form to cast his/her vote.
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Figure 17. Form to cast ballot.
When the voter press the “Press Here to Vote” button, the X-Ballot system
creates an Xml file (i.e., eballot-x.xml) in which voter’s all ballot data are stored. Note
that, “x” represents 1, 2, 3, and so on. For instance, 1st electronic ballot is named as
eballot-1.xml. The X-Ballot system generate individual electronic ballot in a form of
xml for each and every voter who cast their vote using the X-Ballot system.
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The X-Ballot uses the XDocument class to efficiently create eballot-x.xml files
rather than using XmlWriter class (XDocument Class Overview (C#) [APA], n.d.).
After creating an eballot-x.xml file, copies of the eballot-x.xml files are sent to all
processes of the X-Ballot system with encrypted data. Figure 18 shows a sample
code of the eballot-x.xml file that utilize the XDocument class in the X-Ballot system.

XDocument xdoc = new XDocument(
new XDeclaration("1.0", "utf-8", "yes"),
new XElement("eballot",
new XElement("selections", new XAttribute("id", "t"),
new XElement("president", lblDispalyPre.Text),
⁞
⁞
xdoc.Save ("eballot-x.xml");

Figure 18. E-ballot creation with required elements.
Figure 19 shows a sample eballot-x.xml file with election data (i.e., chosen
candidates, voter’s ID, etc.). This sample file displays data in plain text (unencrypted
data) and the structure of the xml document.
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Figure 19. eballot-x.xml file.
Immediately after casting the vote, the eballot-x.xml file is encrypted by the
election process’s administrator and send copies of the files to each process in the
X-Ballot system. Figure 20 shows the main administration form used in this prototype
application. The next steps of the X-Ballot system are explained through the tally
process.
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Figure 20. Main administration form.
Before sending the eballot-x.xml file to the tally process, the <voter_reg_id>
is encrypted with election process administrator’s asymmetric key for minimizing
privacy related matters which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Figure 21 shows the eballot-x.xml file after encrypting the <voter_reg_id> element.
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Figure 21. E-ballot with an encrypted voter ID.
Then the digital signature for the xml document is generated by using the
singing process of the administration form as shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Signing process.
The generated digital signature for tally process is attached to the document
as shown in Figure 23 (Signature code is inside the dashed line box).
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Figure 23. E-ballot with a digital signature.
After placing the digital signature in the eballot-x.xml file, the data belonging to
each process are encrypted with the combination of symmetric and asymmetric keys
which belong to each process. The data of each process are encrypted with AES
session keys (i.e., randomly generated symmetric keys) and the session keys are
encrypted with unique RSA asymmetric keys (i.e., public key of the relevant
processes). When sending the eballot-x.xml file to tally process, the main <eballot>
element is encrypted by using the encryption keys of tally process. Other data in the
electronic ballot are encrypted by using the encryption keys of relevant process to
prevent unauthorized access from irrelevant parties (i.e., other processes or any
other unauthorized external accesses).
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The X-Ballot system generated separate pair of public and private keys for
each process and store those in secure containers. Later the decryption processes
can obtain their private keys from the secure container once they want to decrypt
the data. The main administration form displayed the public keys of each process.
Figure 24 shows a final encrypted file (i.e., Tally_eballot-x.xml) which is finally sent to
the tally process. In this file, all sensitive information has been encrypted and
replaced with the <EncryptedData> element. The X-Ballot system does the same
operation for all available electronic ballots. These files are the inputs for the tally
process to perform its tasks.

Figure 24. Encrypted E-ballot-tally_eballot-x.xml.
When the tally process receives all the signed and encrypted electronic
ballots, the tally process starts the decryption process. Figure 25 shows the
decryption section of the tally process. The private key of the tally process is
displayed only for illustration purposes in this prototype application.
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Figure 25. Decryption section of the tally process.
Figure 26 shows a decrypted e-ballot which belongs to the tally process. After
successful decryption, the tally process can see the voter’s candidate choices (i.e.,
data in the dashed line box) that are required to perform the main tasks of tally
process. However, the tally process cannot see or use the other e-ballot data
because its decryption process cannot decrypt data that are not belong to the tally
process.
Similarly, other processes use their private keys to decrypt the contents and
reveal the data that they are authorized to see or to perform their relevant operations.
Once the decryption is over, the tally process can start the digital signature
verification of the received e-ballots. Once the tally process administrator clicks on
the “Verify Signature” button, the X-Ballot system automatically checks the signature
of all e-ballots. Once the system finishes completing the verification, the system
prompts a message as shown in Figure 27. Then the tally process administrator can
click on “Check Integrity” button to view the results of the verification in the tally form
as shown in Figure 28.
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Figure 26. Decrypted E-ballot of the tally process.
The X-Ballot system highlight the e-ballots in red which failed the signature
verification as shown in Figure 27. Moreover, the system shows the number of
e-ballots with failed verification. The failure of verification indicates that the data in
those e-ballots have been tampered with. This mechanism helps the X-Ballot system
to assure the integrity of e-ballot data any time after casting of electronic votes. In this
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way, each and every process can verify the integrity of their data without depending
on another application.

Figure 27. Digital signature verification completion message.

Figure 28. Digital signature validity status.
The X-Ballot system also proposes a mechanism to protect the privacy of
voters. For example, if tally process needs to verify the voter’s ID before starting the
counting process, the tally process can request the administration process to validate
voter’s IDs. Neither the tally process nor administration process of X-Ballot system
can see voter’s ID and their vote together.
The tally process can generate an XML-based ID file (i.e.,
FileSendByTallyProcess.xml) which contains encrypted voter IDs which are received
from the e-ballots as shown in Figure 29.
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Figure 29. FileSendByTallyProcess.xml.
The tally process doesn’t see voters’ ID in plain text. Therefore, the tally
process sends a request to administration process to validate encrypted voter’s IDs
in the “FileSendByTallyProcess.xml” file by pressing “Request Validate User IDs”
button as shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 30. Voter ID validation form
Then the administration process receives a notification message about the
request to validate voters IDs as shown in Figure 31.

Figure 31. Administration process–voter ID validation request message
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Once the administration process receives the request, the file is decrypted by
the administration process and checks the validity of the voter IDs’ sent by the tally
process, as shown in Figure 32. The administration process compares the received
IDs with not only the initial voter registration information file (“Voter_Registration.xml”)
but also with IDs recorded in the “CastedVotersIDs.xml” that contains only the IDs of
voters who actually voted during the election time.

Figure 32. Voter ID validation.
Then the results (i.e., status of the IDs) are sent back to the tally process. The
tally process can then tabulate the information as shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 33. Voter ID validation-results.
After ID verification, the tally process proceeds to the counting sub-process
and displays the final results as shown in Figure 34. The final election results can be
viewed by pressing the “Display Results” button as shown in Figure 34. The full
source code of the X-Ballot system is available in Appendix B.

Figure 34. Election results.
Summary
This chapter covered the implementation of the proposed EVS which used the
Microsoft .Net 2013 framework. The new EVS was developed as a prototype using
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Visual C# language with the help of some in-built classes provided by the .Net
framework. The chapter explained in detail the processes of the new voting system
and its mechanism used to protect and monitor the integrity of the electronic ballots
and the privacy of the voters. The next chapter explains how the new system was
evaluated and compared with existing systems with respect to several criteria.
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Chapter V: Discussion
Introduction
This chapter describes how the proposed X-Ballot system was evaluated
using analytical hierarchy process (AHP). The new system was compared with two
other existing systems with respect to four main criteria. The chapter explains in
detail how the evaluation was conducted and also shows the data and calculations
involved in the evaluation process.
Evaluation
Saaty (1990) introduced analytical hierarchy process which is a multi-criteria
decision making method. The AHP process is commonly used for evaluating
alternatives using multiple criteria. For example, an engineering field may use AHP
when they want to make decision about the most appropriate technology among
available technologies to perform a particular task. The AHP process enable us to
use several criteria to evaluate alternatives. In this thesis, four main criteria were
used to evaluate the proposed X-Ballot system and two other alternatives. The four
criteria used in the AHP process are as follows:
i.

Design and the main technologies used in the system (i.e., robustness/
efficiency/effectiveness/usefulness) (Criterion 1)

ii.

Effectiveness in terms of integrity (Criterion 2)

iii.

Cost effectiveness of the system (Criterion 3)

iv.

Design for privacy protection (Criterion 4)
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In this thesis, X-Ballot system and two other systems were used in the
evaluation process. The three system used in this evaluation are as follows:
i.

X-Ballot system (Alternative 1)

ii.

EVS of North Dakota State University (Alternative 2)

iii.

Verifiable EVS (Alternative 3)

The evaluation process was structured for all three systems as shown in
Figure 35. Electronic voting system of North Dakota State University (NDSU) is used
by the university community for online elections such as university student body
election. Kaminski and Perry (2006) proposed verifiable electronic voting system
(VEV) which is an open source electronic voting system designed to protect the
secrecy of ballot data. Three volunteers who have several years of experience in the
field of software engineering evaluated the three systems by means of AHP process.
Evaluation results (i.e., priority vector values of three evaluators) were averaged to
minimize the subjectivity of the process.

Figure 35. AHP hierarchy.
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As the first step, the four criteria were compared using the pairwise
comparison technique of the AHP process using the following scale as shown in
Table 2 where 1 means same level of importance and 9 indicates extreme
importance.
Table 2
Scales and Descriptions for AHP Pairwise Comparison
Scale

Degree of Preference

1

Equally Importance

2

Weak or slight

3

Moderate importance

4

Moderate plus

5

Strong importance

6

Strong plus

7

Very strong or demonstrated importance

8

Super strong

9

Extremely importance

Pairwise comparison matrix for the four criteria is shown in Table 3. The
column total (CT) values of the matrix were used to normalize the comparison values
in the matrix by dividing each value from the column total. Table 4 shows the priority
vector (PV) values of the four criteria. These priority vector values were calculated by
averaging the row sum of the matrix shown in Table 4. The three evaluators followed
the same process individually and independently. After obtaining their PV values for
the four criteria, their PV values for each criterion were averaged to get the final PV
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value for each criterion. Table 3 and 4 show the calculations of first evaluation done
by the first evaluator.
Table 3
Comparison Matrix of Criteria
C1

C2

C3

C4

C1

1

1/5

4

1/4

C2

5

1

8

3

C3

1/4

1/8

1

1/6

C4

4

1/3

6

1

CT

10 1/4

1 2/3

19

4 2/5

Table 4
Priority Vector Matrix of Criteria
C1

C2

C3

C4

Total

PV

C1

0.098

0.121

0.211

0.057

0.485

0.121

C2

0.488

0.603

0.421

0.679

2.191

0.548

C3

0.024

0.075

0.053

0.038

0.190

0.048

C4

0.390

0.201

0.316

0.226

1.133

0.283

The resultant values need to be checked for consistency. The consistency
check was performed using the equation 1 and 2. In order to accept the comparison
values, Consistency Ratio (CR) value should be equal or less than 0.10 (10%).

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝐶𝐼) =

(𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 – 𝑛 )
(𝑛 − 1)

-------------------------------- (1)
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𝜆max is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix, and 𝑛 is the order of the
matrix.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐶𝑅) =

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝐶𝐼)
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑅𝐼)

-------------------------------- (2)

The random indexes (RI) for the matrices are shown in Table 5. RI values of
0.58 and 0.9 were used for the consistency check of the three alternatives and four
criteria, respectively.
Table 5
Random Index (RI)
Random Index
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.00

0.00

0.58

0.9

1.12

1.24

1.32

1.41

1.46

1.49

For the first criteria evaluation, the Consistency Ratio value was 0.078 (7.8%).
This value is acceptable because it is less than 0.10 (10%). For each evaluation, CR
value was calculated. Figure 36 shows the averaged Priority Vector values of the four
criteria used in this thesis.
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C1

C2

Criteria

C3

C4

0.121

First Evaluation
0.548
0.048

0.283

0.120

Second Evaluation
0.557
0.053

0.269

0.102

Third Evaluation
0.583
0.050

0.266

0.115

0.562

Third place

Average

0.050

Result (Criterion importance)
First place
Fourth place

0.273
Second place

Figure 36. Averaged priority vectors and Rankings of criteria.
The aforementioned process was used to evaluate the three systems used in
this thesis. Table 6 shows the pairwise comparison values of the three systems for
the first criterion, technology & design. Similarly, Table 7, 8, and 9 show the
comparison values of the three systems in terms of other three criteria1. Table 10, 11,
12, and 13 show the priority vectors (PV) for each system. The second and third
evaluations followed the same process. Table 14 shows the averaged priority vectors
for all three systems.

1

The data shown in Tables from 6 to 13 belong only to the first evaluation.
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Table 6

Table 7

Design & Technology

Safeguarding Integrity

S1
S2
S3
CT

S1
1
1/8
1/3
1 1/2

S2
8
1
4
13

S3
3
1/4
1
4 1/4

S1
S2
S3
CT

S1
1
1/3
1/5
1 1/2

Table 8

Table 9

Cost Effectiveness

Privacy Protection

S1
S2
S3
CT

S1
1
1/4
1
2 1/4

S2
4
1
3
8

S3
1
1/3
1
2 1/3

S1
S2
S3
CT

S1
1
1/3
1/3
1 2/3

S2
3
1
1/2
4 1/2

S3
5
2
1
8

S2
3
1
1/2
4 1/2

S3
3
2
1
6

Table 10

Table 11

Priority Vector: Design & Technology

Priority Vector: Safeguarding Integrity

S1

S2

S3

S1

S2

S3

Total

PV

S1

0.686

0.615

0.706

2.007 0.669

Total

PV
S1

0.652

0.667

0.625

1.944

0.648

S2

0.086

0.077

0.059

0.221 0.074

S2

0.217

0.222

0.250

0.690

0.230

S3

0.229

0.308

0.235

0.772 0.257

S3

0.130

0.111

0.125

0.367

0.122

Table 12

Table 13

Priority Vector: Cost Effectiveness

Priority Vector: Privacy Protection

S1

S2

S3

Total

S1

0.444

0.500

0.429

1.373

S2

0.111

0.125

0.143

0.379

S3

0.444

0.375

0.429

1.248

PV

S1

S2

S3

Total

PV

0.458

S1

0.600

0.667

0.500

1.767

0.589

0.126

S2

0.200

0.222

0.333

0.756

0.252

0.416

S3

0.200

0.111

0.167

0.478

0.159
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Table 14
Averaged Priority Vector Values of the Three Systems
System
Criteria

Evaluations
System 1

System 2

System 3

First Evaluation

0.669

0.074

0.257

Second Evaluation

0.665

0.104

0.231

Third Evaluation

0.688

0.078

0.234

Average PV

0.674

0.085

0.241

First Evaluation

0.648

0.230

0.122

Second Evaluation

0.753

0.172

0.075

Third Evaluation

0.723

0.174

0.103

Average PV

0.708

0.192

0.100

First Evaluation

0.458

0.126

0.416

Second Evaluation

0.480

0.115

0.405

Third Evaluation

0.429

0.143

0.429

Average PV

0.456

0.128

0.417

First Evaluation

0.589

0.252

0.159

Second Evaluation

0.608

0.272

0.120

Third Evaluation

0.707

0.201

0.092

Average PV

0.635

0.242

0.124

Criteria 1

Criteria 2

Criteria 3

Criteria 4
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In order to get the final results, all weight values of the three systems were
multiplied by the ranking values of the criteria as follows2.
0.674

0.708

0.456

0.635

0.085

0.192

0.128

0.242

0.241

0.100

0.417

0.124

0.115
X

0.562

0.050
0.273

0.672



0.190
0.139

System 1
(X-Ballot)
System 2
(NDSU Sys)
System 3
(VEV)

The results of the evaluations shows that the proposed XML based system
(i.e., X-Ballot system) obtained the highest value of 0.672. The final values for the
NDSU e-voting system and the VEV are 0.19 and 0.13, respectively. Therefore, this
results indicate that the X-Ballot system is an effective solution to secure electronic
voting system in terms of integrity and privacy.
The evaluation process focused on the e-voting systems’ capabilities of
ensuring data integrity, privacy, the overall strength of the technologies used in the
systems and the cost effectiveness of the implementation of the systems. The XML
security techniques are the major technologies used in the design and the
implementation of the proposed X-Ballot system. In particular, the strength of the
XML-based encryption and digital signature techniques used in the X-Ballot system,
supported to minimize integrity and privacy related concerns of electronic voting in a
cost effective manner.

2

Note that this is a matrix multiplication.
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XML is the underlying technology for the design of the proposed X-Ballot
system. All system generated files such as electronic ballots that are used by the
voters to cast their vote and other required files are in the form of XML file format.
The encrypted XML files received by the each process of the X-Ballot system ensure
that unauthorized parties cannot access sensitive data in the files. The digital
signature in each electronic ballot helps election officials to make sure the system
consists of strong security measures to ensure the integrity (accuracy, consistency,
and trustworthiness) of election data. Ensuring voters’ privacy is another goal of this
thesis. Therefore, the proposed X-Ballot system introduce a mechanism to verify eballot sensitive data such as IDs of voters without violating privacy of the voters.
In order to make sure all system generated XML files are well written and
valid, all XML files in the X-Ballot system were validated (Markup Validation Service
[APA], n.d.). In addition, the system generated keys for the encryption process are
kept in secure containers.
Summary
This chapter described, how the X-Ballot system was evaluated in terms of
four important properties of electronic voting systems. The new proposed system was
compared with two other systems. All the steps involved in the evaluation process
were explained in this chapter. The next chapter presents conclusion and possible
future works of the new approach.
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Chapter VI: Conclusions and Future Works
Introduction
This chapter presents a brief description of the thesis and summarizes the
findings. The chapter also provides recommendations for future work related to the
proposed new system.
Conclusion
Electronic voting is the electronic form of voting and it makes the voting
process more accurate, efficient, and also helps to increase voter turnout. However,
security is a major concern of EVS. Therefore, e-voting systems need to satisfy
several important security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and privacy. Protecting these essential security requirements is a very challenging
task. Unauthorized parties can change sensitive data of e-voting systems for many
different purposes through malicious attacks. Unauthorized modification of data in
EVS, violate integrity requirement of the system. In order to prevent inappropriate use
of electronic data, considering only the physical security is no longer adequate.
Critical systems like EVS are highly vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. Therefore,
these systems often need robust security measures and enhancements to protect
important and critical data in their electronic ballots.
In this thesis, a new secure e-voting system was proposed to verify and
safeguard the integrity and preserve the privacy of EVS in an efficient, less
complicated, and also less expensive manner. The new EVS used advanced XML
security standards such as XML encryption and XML Digital Signature, and also
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Visual Studio.Net framework technologies. XML technologies used in this thesis
significantly contributed to make the system very efficient. The proposed new
approach was evaluated with two other existing EVS. The results showed that the
new approach is very effective in verifying and defending integrity of electronic voting
process as well as protecting privacy of voters. The proposed EVS is a better voting
system for small and mid-size electoral populations. With the proposed approach,
organizations can manage their voting process with confident. While the new
approach reduces the effort needed to develop secure e-voting systems it also
lowers the costs of developing e-voting systems for small and mid-size electoral
populations.
Future Works
The proposed X-Ballot system designed to safeguard and detect integrity
related issues of EVS and also to protect privacy. Therefore, the proposed system
need to be improved to satisfy other security requirements of electronic voting such
as confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and availability.
The proposed X-Ballot EVS is suitable for elections where the size of the
election range from small to medium. The new system can be further improved to be
used in large election processes with few modifications. A large election may have
millions of voters. If an electronic election has a huge amount of votes, processing
each and every e-ballot individually could be an inefficient approach. Therefore, at a
certain point, a set of e-ballot data can be consolidated into a few separate files to
reduce the burden and make the process more efficient and effective. This sort of
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improvements may also help reducing the network traffic and the high demand of
computer resources such as computer memory, high performance central processing
units, and high speed network connections.
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Appendix A: E-Voting Survey Questionnaire and Results
Q1: How do you rank the importance of the factors of e-voting system?
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Q2: Do you think voting will eventually become completely electronic?
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Q3: How do you rank the following advantages of e-voting System?

85
Q4: How do you rank the following e-voting attributes according to potential threat
level (Give one to highest)?
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Q5: How do you rank the following e-voting attributes according to the level of
harmfulness on voters if a malfunction take place in voting process (Give “one” to the
most harmful attribute)?
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Q6: Select your top 3 e-voting attributes that you expect from an e-voting system as a
voter.
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Q7: How do rank the following e-voting attributes according to the level of attention
required by election authority (Ex: Election authority should pay more attention to
your no “1” choice)?
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Q8: In your opinion what is the e-voting attribute which has more social and/or ethical
issues?
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Appendix B: Source Code of X-Ballot System

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

